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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

Officers' Leadership Role Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Apr 84 p 2

[Article: "We Discuss the Letter 'The Officer's Personal Example'"]

[Text] The editors continue to receive readers' responses to the letter from a tank battalion commander, Guards Major M. Bogatyrev, "The Officer's Personal Example," which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 20 March. The readers are unanimous in the opinion: the conversation which was begun on the pages of the newspaper is timely and needed. Lieutenant Colonel V. Suprunenko, Captain 2d Rank V. Bakal'chuk, Guards Captain V. Ivanov, reserve officers D. Zuyev, M. Mitel'nyy, I. Sanits, A. Shasherin, and others stress in their letters that success in ensuring the officer's personal example depends to a great extent on how active he is in service, demanding of himself and his subordinates, and uncompromising toward shortcomings.

Today we publish the next set of readers' letters.

The Interests of the Service Require This

We discussed Guards Major M. Bogatyrev's letter at an officers' service conference. I think that it provides good food for thought and a critical evaluation of the facts which we encounter in life.

I recall the last officers' call. In the course of a sharp, frank exchange of opinions Captain V. Borodin turned to a section chief, Senior Lieutenant G. Poddubnyy:

"You can rarely be seen in the subunit in the evening. Are you able to solve all the problems during the day? Or perhaps you think that you are free from work with the personnel in the evening hours?"

"And I am not accustomed to substituting for sergeants and the subunit first sergeant," Poddubnyy answered. "Moreover, the work about which you speak is overtime for me."

Such a reply greatly surprised and astonished those who had mastered the truth in officers' life: he is required to work in the subunit as much as the interests of the service and a rise in combat readiness require. I personally am profoundly unsympathetic to those officers who scrupulously calculate how many hours of "overtime they worked" and later submit complaints and request compensatory time.

However, let us return again to Senior Lieutenant Poddubnyy. His position is to work within "certain limits," as he says, according to the daily schedule. And, most likely, no one would have spoken even a word of reproach to him had he ensured the proper military order in his section. But the fact is that all is not well here.

Altogether several men are subordinate to Senior Lieutenant Poddubnyy. But the delinquencies committed by one soldier-driver alone are most likely more than in the entire platoon. The officer reported regularly to the battery commander about each of them and considered his mission accomplished with this: let him adopt measures, he says, talk to the soldier and, if necessary, punish him.

Or here he said that he is not accustomed to substituting for sergeants. Of course, substituting is a faulty process. But then, to work with them and teach them is the officer's direct service responsibility. It is necessary to do this not only on lessons, but also in the evening, in the barracks. I know from experience: people open up more completely in a heart-to-heart talk.

It should be said that bewilderment and bitterness are caused me by the striving of individual graduates of the military schools "seemingly not to be overworked." Here Lieutenant V. Chudin joined us. A capable specialist. But you are struck by one thing at once: he always hurries as rapidly as possible from duty to the dormitory as if he has nothing to do in the barracks. And one more thing attracted attention--his inquiries: how are the conveniences of life here, where is it better to spend free time?

I do not deny that the young officer should also be interested in these questions. But, evidently, not to such a degree that service matters recede into the background.

During my years of service, I have also met officers who are not sincerely attracted to social matters, in particular, to work with the youth. One day, as battalion chief of staff I was invited to a Komsomol meeting in one of the batteries. I looked, and some of the subunit officers whom the youth had invited did not come to it. I was interested in where they were. It turned out that one had hurried to the television set to see a hockey match, another was interested in a motion picture at the Officers' House, and a third was urgently required to put the finishing touches to an apartment. In short, each one found his "valid" reason. One thing is hard to believe: is it really possible to leave the barracks for the solution of some personal problems if the Komsomols invited them to a collective council and if the possibility appeared to delve deeper into the sphere of the subordinates' concerns and interests?

I will not say that officers who did not find the time to attend the Komsomol meeting and avoided contacts with people were poor specialists. However, when talk turned to participation in a social measure they then recalled the "standard" work day of the officer. What can be said in this regard? It turns out that we, the commanders, do a poor job of explaining to subordinate officers their duty and obligations, and we assume that they are trained people and understand everything well.

Most likely, I am too categorical and sharp in my judgements. But believe me, I am always caused indignation by an indifferent attitude toward the performance of duties and by references to some "objective" difficulties of people who in fact give little energy to that to which they decided to devote their entire lives. I am convinced: A person who demands much for himself but contributes little of his own efforts to service and to the upbringing of subordinates has a weak foundation himself in his character and behavior.

One day a battery commander, Major N. Starilov, who does not spare his strength for service and is frequently detained in the barracks until late was reproached by one of the officers: "What's your problem, do you need to work more than everyone else?" Starilov answered as follows:

"Yes, just as many officers in our battalion I need confidence: here I leave the barracks and firm military order will be maintained here. And I also want our battery to be among the best in the unit."

I like such people. Thanks to such selfless officers who are devoted to the cause (I would now also name among them Major I. Lityuk, Captains A. Ponomarev and V. Borodin, and Senior Lieutenants Yu. Marchenko and V. Kolodin) our battalion was recently evaluated with the highest grade for firing on the range.

Major S. Zhovner, commander of a surface-to-air missile battalion, Southern Group of Forces

Learn from the Experience of the Seniors

I am confident: the questions raised in the letter of Guards Major M. Bogatyrev interest not only young officers but also veterans of the Armed Forces. And I, who have served in the combat formation for 10 years, would like to say a good word about those officers who learned loyalty to duty and military skill.

I began my service as a driver in a company commanded by Major V. Nosik. He was able to learn the soldier's soul with amazing fineness, discover abilities in a person and develop them thoughtfully, and lead a subordinate from success to success. One day, Major Nosik said to me: "You can be developed into a good commander." I did not believe these words at once. But Major Nosik persistently advised me to study and increase my knowledge. And he helped me in everything. In essence, he determined my subsequent destiny.

I became a sergeant in this company, and then an extended-serviceman. I later served in this same company as an officer, from where I departed for study in a

military academy. In admonishing me on parting, Vasiliy Pavlovich Nosik said: "Don't forget your company...." And how could I forget my combat family and favorite commander?

Not long before graduation from the academy I arrived in my company. Major Nosik commanded it. How Vasiliy Pavlovich was happy to see me. He conducted me through the barracks and through the motor pool and showed me everything new which had appeared here thanks to his concerns. He told with pride about his subordinates, their talents and abilities, and predicted who of them can become what in several years.

All those who passed through Major Nosik's school, I believe, will remember his lessons and admonitions forever and will follow his lofty example of a responsible attitude toward the assigned matter.

It should be said that in service I was lucky to have commanders and chiefs from whom I could learn. I often recall the course chief in the academy, Colonel M. Orehov. Here is one who truly loved the uniform and wore it with dignity and honor! And he held us, the students, strictly responsible for the slightest violations.

I had the occasion to serve under the command of Major General of Aviation V. Stebenev. He appeared to be very strict, even severe. But his subordinates respected him deeply. And first of all--for his deep knowledge and for a cordial attitude toward people. When he comes to a unit he visits all the work rooms of the headquarters and speaks with each officer. It is as if his praise would give us wings, and a reprimand for negligence was perceived more acutely than the strictest punishment. How often we, already elderly officers, caught ourselves striving to be like General Stebenev in every way!

Today, I would like to advise young officers: learn from the example of your seniors, adopt their valuable experience.

Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve)
V. Preobrazhenskiy

Leadership Discussion Continues

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 84 p 2

[Article: "We Discuss the Letter 'The Officer's Personal Example'"]

[Text] The editors have received more than 200 responses since the publication of the letter by Guards Major M. Bogatyrev, "The Officer's Personal Example" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 March). Officers B. Karpov, N. Bondarenko, V. Savritskiy, V. Lupinos, and others shared their thoughts on the questions touched on in the letter. Participants in the Great Patriotic War and veterans of the Armed Forces N. Amosov, N. Tarbetskiy, V. D'yachenko, G. Ladnyy, and A. Yakhnitskiy told about ensuring the personal example of officers in battle and in the training and indoctrination of subordinates.

Today we publish the next set of readers' letters.

And They Kept Silent at the Meeting

I can say without exaggeration: not one of the aviators in our unit remained indifferent to the letter of Guards Major M. Bogatyrev, "The Officer's Personal Example." And this is understandable--the subject of the conversation is so close to each of us that it automatically causes the desire to look around attentively and express one's opinion. We also encounter much about which the letter's author writes. Take, let us say, the question of the organization and conduct of officers' calls. I should like to talk about why, at times, the effectiveness of such meetings proves to be lower than was expected.

I cannot forget the feeling of dissatisfaction which remained after the discussion, at a meeting, of the conduct of Senior Lieutenant V. Titov. This officer repeatedly violated military discipline and had a listless attitude toward the accomplishment of his service duties. So here it was thought that at the officers' call his fellow-servicemen would hold the aviator strictly responsible and would point out his shortcomings to him in a comradely manner. However, this did not happen. Those who assembled listened indifferently to a report on the subject of the talk and quietly kept silent. To make up for it, after the meeting the aviators spoke rather long about the unworthy behavior of Senior Lieutenant V. Titov. Why weren't words of condemnation heard during the meeting?

"And why do a lot of talking at the meeting?" declared Captain A. Bazhan when the secretary of the party organization, Captain A. Kamashev, asked him the reason for the silence. (After the meeting A. Bazhan spoke with enviable ardor about the officer's personal example, about his honor and dignity, and about the components of authority.)

In analyzing the captain's skeptical tirade, I came to a conclusion: To a great extent, it was caused by the circumstance that the results of a discussion at officers' calls frequently remain without consequences. For what happens sometimes? Fellow-servicemen sharply criticize a negligent officer, speak of shortcomings without beating around the bush, and propose specific measures for their elimination. But then they all scatter and nothing changed: the violator, getting off with a light scare, as they say, goes about things in the old way.

Captain Bazhan and all of us had the opportunity to be convinced earlier of the poor effectiveness of such discussions. The same Senior Lieutenant V. Titov had been invited by his fellow servicemen many times already for a strict, serious talk. But these talks had no real consequences although those who spoke proposed punishing the officer without any allowances for his unworthy behavior. And here, of course, it primarily our fault: we, the leaders, did not always listen to the opinion of the collective.

And here is another example. Not so long ago at an officers' call, we had a detailed conversation about strengthening discipline among the aviation specialists and raising their responsibility for the preparation of the equipment for flights. Here Senior Lieutenant of Technical Service Yu. Il'in was seriously reproached.

At the meeting, the flight technician had to listen to many severe but valid criticisms. The aviators unanimously spoke in favor of an officers' comradely court of honor to be concerned with him. It was soon convened and adopted the decision to petition the command for a one-grade reduction in the officer's rank. On the basis of this, all the necessary documents were drawn up and sent to higher headquarters. What was our bewilderment when they reported from there that there are no grounds for implementation of the decision by the officers' comradely court of honor. They say it is necessary to indoctrinate the violator.

In my opinion, work on ensuring an officer's personal example will be genuinely effective only when precisely public opinion, that testimonial which his comrades in the combat formation give to him, will be one of the determining points in the evaluation of his activity. By the way, then there will not be any kind of non-talkers at officers' calls.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Shevtsov, 1st Class
Military Pilot

For My Entire Life

It is a known truth: subordinates always compare their step and their behavior with the commander. I had the occasion to serve many years in the regiment commanded by Colonel M. Voronin. For we officers, he was an example in everything. We learned from him first and foremost the art of training and indoctrinating subordinates.

Colonel Voronin had the amazing ability to charge others with his energy. Let us say, if he put on gym clothes and went to the stadium to work out, all we officers also followed his example.

I will not forget the following case, either. One day (my inattentiveness was at fault) I was late in noticing Colonel Voronin walking toward me and was late in saluting. It turned out that he saluted me first. Clearly, I experienced embarrassment. But the regimental commander, stopping me, did not reproach me with one word for my negligence. He was interested in matters, the state of my health (and at that moment I was feeling sick), and wished me a speedy recovery. I will remember his tact and cordial attitude toward people all my life.

Senior Lieutenant (Retired) N. Tikhonov

Naval Leadership Ends Discussion

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by Admiral P. Medvedev, member of the Military Council and Chief of the Navy Political Directorate: "A State Person"]

[Text] In our opinion, the letter of Guards Major M. Bogatyrev is being discussed in an interesting and businesslike manner on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. And this is proper. For the questions touched upon in it pertain in one way or another to what is most important for military people--raising combat readiness.

Under conditions of the intensification of the aggressiveness of the imperialism of the United States and the other NATO countries and the increased military danger our party and the Soviet government, remaining consistently loyal to the Leninist peace-loving course in foreign policy, are strengthening the country's defensive capability and, as noted in the documents of the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation, are doing and will do "everything necessary so that the weapons and technical equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces and their combat might are at the most contemporary level."

It is important that these means be in reliable hands and be used with maximum effectiveness. Our main strength is people who are armed with a scientific Marxist-Leninist world outlook and who are able to master the weapons entrusted to them in an excellent manner. And in particular, the role of the officers is great. The main responsibility for the high combat readiness of units and ships rests on them.

The Soviet officer, whatever post he may occupy, can be called a state person with full justification. His activity is linked with national tasks of state importance--with ensuring the country's reliable security and with the defense of socialism's achievements. In truth, all our people also see in the officer a representative of the Soviet state and champion of the party's policy in the Armed Forces. And therefore he, in turn, should approach his obligations and rights in a state manner.

The officer and commander is granted great authority, and it is very important that he use it correctly. At the same time, just as important is such a means of indoctrination, which is regulated by life, as the force of the military leader's personal example which consists, first and foremost, of his devotion to duty and service. The officer is required to be an example of military skill, courage, performance, and spiritual nobility for his subordinates.

The routine military days of the Armed Forces are filled with examples of the highest responsibility and genuine selflessness of commanders and political officers in the performance of service duty.

The nuclear guided missile cruiser "Kirov" recently returned from a long ocean cruise. The crew was the initiator of socialist competition in the Navy and coped successfully with the assigned missions under the difficult conditions of the voyage. Here great credit belongs to the ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Sergeyevich Koval'chuk. He is one of those officers who is giving himself whole-heartedly to naval service and relates to matters with a sense of highest responsibility, justifying the party's confidence on the sector entrusted to him.

What distinguishes Comrade Koval'chuk and what constitutes his personal example? There are many components. They are commander's enthusiasm and highest professional competence. They are demandingness toward people and concern for them as well as a lofty style in mutual relations with subordinates. Independence in the solution of problems which arise. Party spirit. Being a member of the party committee, officer Koval'chuk takes an active part in all matters of the party organization and successfully directs its activity and the efforts of the communists, Komsomols, and all personnel toward the quality accomplishment of training tasks.

We especially stress the unity of the class interests and goals for which the commander of the ship and his subordinates are struggling shoulder to shoulder.

Merging into a single whole, all these abundant sources form a powerful, purposeful stream before the onslaught of which no obstacle can stand.

The personal example of the ship's commander is the spring which forces department commanders and all officers to work in the same style. And therefore a businesslike, creative atmosphere makes itself felt in all elements of the nuclear guided missile cruiser "Kirov." The personnel are successfully accomplishing their tasks and are accomplishing the lofty socialist obligations in the competition under the slogan, "Be on the alert and in constant readiness for the defense of socialism's achievements!" confidently, as befits the initiator.

Life shows that the officer's authority depends first and foremost on how much he gives to the matter--on his moral positions in service and life, devotion to principle, and personal qualities.

Captain-Lieutenant A. Kalachev, a department commander of the escort ship "Leningradskiy Komsomolets" and deputy secretary of the party organization, is highly thought of in the force of surface ships of the Northern Fleet. And there are impressive grounds for this. Kalachev is a master of military affairs and was declared the best specialist in the force in accordance with the results of the winter training period. The subunit which he commands accomplished its tasks on the long voyage with high quality and achieved the title of "excellent." The political lessons group where he is the leader is also one of the best.

In examining the question of the officer's personal example, in my opinion, his ability to follow two well-known principles simultaneously should be regarded as of paramount importance: "Do as I do!" and the unity of word and deed. Why do such officers as Yu. Churilov, A. Ol'khovikov, Ye. Severin, and R. Sokolov attain high results in work with people? Because they can always show subordinates personally how one or another task should be accomplished and their word does not differ from deed. And what if they tried to convince a person of something and proceeded absolutely differently in life themselves? The impact would be absolutely different. To tear apart word and deed is the same as erecting something with one hand and destroying what has been built with the other.

Unfortunately, not everyone understands this. Recently, I had the occasion to be on a ship where all was not well with discipline and indoctrinational work. What was the reason for the shortcomings? It turned out that the commander of the ship does not delve into the situation in the subunits in the proper manner. As a rule, measures are conducted on a ship's scale. This is motivated as follows: I do not want, they say, to substitute for the subunit commanders. But all the officers in the subunits are young and each one needs specific assistance, prompting, and the live example of a senior comrade. But instead of this, they are taught lessons of passivity, indifferent contemplation, and poor accomplishment of functional duties.

A certain gap between word and deed is also inherent in officers N. Zhebrak and A. Balashov. They lost touch with their subordinates. And how paradoxical it is that they explain the serious shortcomings which they committed in political-indoctrinational work and discipline by the personnel's being greatly occupied with duties.

The officer should always remember that he is in sight of the enlisted men, and the higher his post the greater the responsibility for combat readiness which rests on him. It is also important to have a good conception of the contemporary requirements imposed on the leader. Comrade K. U. Chernenko spoke of them at a meeting with personnel of the party's Central Committee apparatus. "The leaders of our time," he stressed, "should be distinguished first and foremost by devotion to the ideals of the party, a deep knowledge of the matter, organizational abilities, a lofty style, and the ability to think on a large scale, feel what is new, and discern it in practice." The evaluation of the personality qualities of commanders and political officers of units and ships and officers of headquarters and political organs should be approached today precisely from this standpoint. In implementing the requirements of the Soviet minister of defense for officer personnel, we should all rise higher, supplement and enrich our knowledge, persistently learn using the best examples and, what is especially important, understand the Leninist style of work.

This presumes: being closer to subordinates, knowing their attitudes and spiritual requirements, and displaying initiative and innovation in work, efficiency and purposefulness, self-criticism, and high self-demandingness. An officer should avoid any showiness and window dressing whatever like a fire: they distract from shortcomings and the struggle against them and close the path to professional growth. More attention should be paid to specific work with a specific person: the party cautions us against generating paper and being carried away by various types of meetings, formalism, and bare administration.

Unquestionably, ensuring the personal example of each officer is a question of great political and state importance today. And, naturally, the role of the political organs and party organizations in its solution is great. They are called upon constantly to delve into its essence, generalize the experience of the leading commanders, and hold strictly responsible those officer-communists in whose behavior there are shortcomings.

Instructive in this regard is the work of the political department where officer V. Ivanov serves. Here, they have a differentiated approach to the indoctrination of officers, persistently introduce effective forms of individual work, and are occupied with each person. The specific briefing of commanders and political officers prior to long cruises has entered the system. The political department and party organizations display great concern that the officers have good knowledge of the traditions of their force and use their strength actively and skillfully in the indoctrination of subordinates.

To be an example worthy of imitation for subordinates with each step--this is how the Soviet officer should understand and accomplish his duty to the motherland, to the party, and to the people.

Officer Discusses Formative Days

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt N. Ustyakin, commander of motorized rifle platoon: "Not for the Sake of 'Tick Marks'"]

[Text] I will tell about the first months of my service as a lieutenant. It was difficult for me: I did not have enough experience and knowledge and really, to put it frankly, personal organization. One day, the subunit commander warned me: we will discuss your attitude toward service at officers' call. I went to it with the hope of hearing not only criticism, but also good wishes and advice. I prepared a special notebook.

But, it turned out, there was nothing to record. No desires or advice were expressed.

I do not know how my fate would have developed subsequently had it not been for officers V. Cherkashin and G. Sergeyev. While inspecting the guard, of which I was the commander, Major Cherkashin disclosed many shortcomings. And he told me about them directly, as they say, without allowances for my youth. At that time I was in such a state that it seemed as though I should react to any criticism oversensitively but here, except for gratitude, I felt nothing. Most likely because Major Cherkashin not only pointed out the shortcomings, but also suggested how to eliminate them.

Later on they heard me, a young communist, at a party meeting. And again the same atmosphere--benevolent and businesslike. The statement of the political officer, Captain G. Sergeyev, sticks in my memory most of all:

"We communists do not set as our goal the 'picking to pieces' of a comrade for the sake of 'tick marks.' To teach him everything that you know yourself and to help him to see the attractive side of service by your attitude toward matters--this is our rule."

The political officer's words have sunk into my memory and heart forever. And I am trying to follow the rule expressed in these words in my service.

Letters Discuss Officers' Development

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 84 p 2

[Article: "Lines from Letters"]

[Text] They are correct when they say: indoctrination is first and foremost the correct behavior of the indoctrinator. I am retaining for my entire life light, good memories of my first commander--the course chief Engineer-Major P. Beletchenko. He himself completed the school with distinction and required the same of his subordinates. It was a joy to study under him.

Engineer-Lieutenant V. Verbetskiy

In my opinion, what is most important for the officer in the question of personal example? It is a sense of responsibility. It should stand out in the deeds and actions of each of us. At times you ask a young officer why he did not accomplish an order on time, and you hear in response: "There was not enough time." It happens that his immediate superior steps forth in the role of defender: he is still young for us, he says, and has little experience. And it never occurred to such a superior that by this he does not help his subordinate, but only dampens his ardor.

Guards Major M. Postnikov

During those distant years we were officer candidates of a training armored train. It was difficult for us at first: we studied complex equipment in the classrooms (and things were not too dense as regards our education), and in the field we learned to fight--we dug foxholes and we did the leopard crawl until exhausted.... At times, we looked at the officer candidates of the adjacent armored railway truck and envied them: their commander was not as demanding as ours and gave them an easy time--in short, he "felt sorry" for them. However, in war we truly valued our commander, Senior Lieutenant F. Martynenko who taught us: better a hundred drops of sweat on an exercise than a drop of blood in battle. I recall that we held up the fascists for several days, supporting a crossing by our troops, and we inflicted great losses on the enemy while we ourselves emerged from the battle almost without losses.

Major (Retired) V. Chinin

6367

CSO: 1801/307

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

HELICOPTER ATTACK SUCCEEDS IN REPULSING 'ENEMY'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Polarov, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "Helicopters Repulse Attack"]

[Text] The "enemy" landed an amphibious force reinforced by tanks and armored vehicles on the coast. The defenders' left flank found itself in a difficult position. Then the senior commander made his decision: to commit the helicopter gunships.

Bettering the standard time, the aviators loaded and suspended units of free rocket projectiles on the helicopters. And soon Lieutenant Colonel G. Ksheminskiy and Major V. Sevryukov led the squadrons of combat helicopters behind them. Exploiting the terrain relief skillfully, the helicopter pilots reached the indicated area covertly, attacking the combat formations of the attacking "enemy" from their flight formation.

The sniper-like salvoes of the aviators disorganized the "enemy." Not letting him recover, the helicopters rolled into a chandelle.

6367

CSO: 1801/310

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

EDITORIAL STRESSES CHOOSING MOST QUALIFIED CADETS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 84 p 1

[Editorial: "In Military Schools--The Deserving"]

[Text] The selection of the youth for military schools and institutes is continuing. It is an important and responsible sector of the work in troop units, on ships, and in the military commissariats. In considerable measure, who will become cadets and, subsequently, officers, depends on its quality. Those entering the schools should possess high political and moral-psychological qualities and have good health and a high level of physical and general educational training.

In the selection of candidates for military educational institutions an important role belongs to the commanders and political officers of units and ships and the staffs and political organs of large units. The selection of candidates for the schools from among the servicemen was conducted better than the others in the Baltic, Volga, and Leningrad Military Districts and in the Southern Group of Forces. But, unfortunately, there are also examples of a weakening of attention to the selection of quality replacements for the schools. Thus, in the Transbaykal Military District this work deteriorated in comparison with last year.

Now one of the urgent tasks is the quality conduct of monthly assemblies with candidate-servicemen. They are necessary for fruitful preparation for their entry into the military schools. In the past there were annoying cases where the officials responsible for the organization of the assemblies diverted the candidates to administrative work without understanding their importance and did not call on experienced teachers for advice. It is necessary to eliminate such shortcomings completely.

This year, too, the majority of the military commissariats are successfully accomplishing plans for the selection of candidates and are sending the most deserving youths to the military educational institutions. This work is conducted better where military-patriotic indoctrination of the predraftee youth is at the proper level and the personnel of the military commissariats operate in close contact with local party and Soviet organs and rely on the assistance of the Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations, military instructors of the schools, and veterans of the Armed Forces. It is just such an approach which is inherent in the republic commissariats of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and the Brest and Donetsk

oblast and city military commissariats of Moscow and Leningrad. Here they strive to disclose ahead of time those who desire to become officers, make a profound study of their professional and moral-political qualities, and render necessary assistance in professional orientation and preparation to enter the military educational institutions.

Recently, they have begun to practice more broadly republic and oblast rallies of pupils who have decided to enter military educational institutions, their meetings with cadets of military schools, and statements of the future officers over local radio and television and in the press. Some of the candidates--and this should only be welcomed--visit the schools on Komsomol passes. Here it is necessary to see that the best of the best are sent on them. Unfortunately, there are also cases of a formal approach to this matter: as practice shows, some of the youths who arrive with such passes are insufficiently trained and are not enrolled for training.

These days, military commissariats are continuing the acceptance and consideration of applications. Their personnel should deal with each candidate with maximum attention and, in close contact with the Komsomol organs, study profoundly and comprehensively and evaluate their moral-political and professional qualities, considering results in training as well as public activity, his moral make-up, state of discipline, and physical training. Each of them must be helped to make the final selection of the military educational institution which would correspond in greatest measure to his desire and actual capabilities.

The experience of past years shows that instances of incorrect or careless drawing up and tardy dispatch of documents to the corresponding echelon and the late sending of candidates to the schools to take the entrance examinations have not yet been completely overcome. There still is time to adopt measures which ban such shortcomings.

Much in the selection of candidates also depends on the military educational institutions themselves. They proceed correctly in those institutions where close ties have been established with units and ships, military commissariats, and Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations. This permits the successful popularization of the profession of Soviet officer, studying the candidates locally ahead of time, and helping in their professional orientation. In the future, too, it is necessary to practice open-house days, agitation-sports trips of future officers, and military-patriotic clubs and schools with the institutions, and the conduct of study groups and lessons on primary military training in the schools by cadets. All this furthers the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and acquaints it with the activity of the schools and the life of the cadets.

As always, the acceptance commissions of the schools are called upon to play an exceptional role in the selection. Their composition should include the best trained and most authoritative commanders, political officers, and teachers. Studying the files which have arrived and evaluating the moral-political, professional, and psychological qualities of the candidates, their state of health, and level of physical and general-educational state of training, the members of these commissions are required to display maximum objectivity and devotion to party principles. They should also be concerned about the creation of favorable conditions for the candidates' preparation for the examinations: provide

them with training supplies and textbooks, distribute the lecture halls and classrooms efficiently, and plan consultations, and on the examinations themselves they should create an atmosphere of good will and display pedagogical tact, patience, and objectivity.

"...Each new generation," Comrade K. U. Chernenko noted in a speech at the April (1984) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "should climb to a higher level of education and general culture, professional qualification, and citizen activity." And properly, with each passing year ever higher demands are imposed on the graduates of military schools. Therefore, naturally, the necessity appears for the quality improvement of the selection of candidates for training. This work should be conducted on all stages so that the best representatives of Soviet youth who are capable of justifying the lofty title of officer of our valiant Armed Forces find themselves in the cadet formation.

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MILITARY HISTORY

EARLY SOVIET OCCUPATION FORCES IN GERMANY DESCRIBED

Moscow NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 84 pp 121-136

[Article by Maj Gen S.I. Tyul'panov*: "On German Soil During the First Postwar Years"]

[Text] When I arrived in Berlin in August of 1945 the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG) had been in existence almost 2 months. It was established on 9 June 1945, exactly a month after the signing of Germany's Unconditional Surrender and 4 days after the promulgation of the Declaration of Germany's Defeat. This document, which was signed by representatives of the USSR, Great Britain, the USA and France, contained the following statement: "There is no central government or authority in Germany capable of assuming responsibility for preserving order, governing the nation or implementing the demands of the victorious powers."¹ In view of this, the allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition announced in the Agreement on a Control System in Germany that supreme authority would be exercised by the commanders-in-chiefs of the four nations, each in his own occupation zone, and that the Control Council set up by them would coordinate their operations and make decisions on matters pertaining to the nation as a whole.²

The political principles defining the main objective of Germany's occupation were formulated at the Potsdam (Berlin) Conference in July and August of 1945: to give the German people the opportunity "to rebuild their lives on a democratic and peaceful basis."³ It discussed the necessity for Germany's demilitarization and denazification and its democratization, including the banning of

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military production and the punishment of war criminals, the elimination of the monopolies and the satisfaction of demands for reparations by peoples who had suffered from the fascist aggression.

SVAG, which was the agency for implementing the Soviet Union's policy toward Germany, consisted of a large team, primarily Soviet Army officers who had arrived in that nation with the military units. It was soon enlarged with specialists in industry, agriculture, education, health and other areas of life. A ramified and specialized system of SVAG gradually developed in Berlin, in the states (Lander), provinces and cities, which defined the specific tasks of the occupation and monitored their accomplishment.

According to the Soviet Union's policy with respect to the German question, SVAG's main task was that of creating the essential conditions and preconditions to enable the German people's democratic and progressive forces themselves to establish a truly democratic, peace-loving society and state on German soil.

The Information Directorate (which is what the Propaganda Directorate, which I was assigned to head, subsequently came to be called) was charged with difficult and responsibility duties: to exercise leadership and control in all areas of political, ideological and cultural life in the Soviet Occupation Zone. The Directorate's specific tasks and functions were refined and modified as conditions changed--mainly as the democratic German organizations grew and gained strength. The Directorate operated under direct instructions from the chief of SVAG (Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and then Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy and Army General V.I. Chuykov) and Lieutenant General F.Ye. Bokov, member of the SVAG Military Council, in communication with the organization of the Political Advisor with the chief (ambassadors A.A. Sobolev and V.S. Semenov).

Numerous studies have been made of the postwar anti-fascist, democratic reforms carried out in the Soviet Occupation Zone during the period 1945-1949, which in the final analysis laid the foundation for the founding of the German Democratic Republic. They provide considerable information on the work performed jointly by SVAG workers, particularly Directorate officers, and German public figures and organizations.⁴ There is still no comprehensive publication on the work performed by SVAG, however, which continued for 4 years and 4 months.

In my opinion, SVAG's truly historic tasks and role are extremely faithfully described in the work "A Brief History of the GDR" by GDR historian, Professor Stefan Doernberg, which has been translated into Russian. "For the first time in history, beginning in 1945," he writes, "a socialist state was performing the functions of an occupying power. Socialism's superiority over capitalism, the humane nature of socialism, proletarian internationalism and the Leninist principles underlying the Soviet Union's foreign policy were graphically manifested in its occupation policy, in the work of SVAG, in the special circumstances. From the first day of its existence the Soviet Military Administration consistently supported Germany's popular masses and functioned as their class ally. It gave German workers a degree of democratic freedom which Germany had not known even during the best years of the bourgeois democracy, while simultaneously helping them to restrain the reactionary forces. SVAG, together with the democratic agencies of self-government, was thereby creating the preconditions

for the popular masses' sovereign exercise of their democratic will. The Soviet Union respected the German people's right to self-determination, encouraged them to exercise it and protected that right against encroachments by the imperialist occupying powers--the USA, England and France--which were attempting to place Germany under their control. The Soviet Military Administration allowed the German people themselves to decide on their social system."⁵

I shall permit myself to cite one other excerpt from that book, which talks about the work methods used by SVAG, its leadership and workers of all titles and ranks: "Especially important were the talks and personal communication of the SVAG chiefs, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov (1945-1946), Marshal

Sokolovskiy (1946-1949) and Army General Chuykov (1949); Semenov, political advisor to the SVAG chief; Major General Tyul'panov, chief of the SVAG Information Directorate; Army General Kurasov and Lieutenant Generals Dratvin and Luk'yanchenko, SVAG chiefs of staff; and Colonel Generals Berzarin and Gorbатов and Major General Kotikov, Soviet military commandants in Berlin, with leading figures of the democratic agencies of self-government, parties and organizations, as well as with many other representatives of the German community.... Soviet workers, peasants and intellectuals, dressed in the military uniform and serving on German soil, followed the German workers' struggle for a democratic Germany with lively interest and effective sympathy. They gave of their know-how to the young democratic forces of the German people, willingly and without any special instructions, guided by a sense of proletarian internationalism and by their common interest in protecting the peace against the instigators of a new war and realizing the hopes and aspirations of the working people."⁶

The words of Alexandr Abusch, prominent party figure and Statesman of the GDR and member of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany], attest to the relations of complete mutual trust and respect between the SVAG workers and members of the anti-fascist, democratic, progressive forces of the German people, especially the communists, who were attempting to derive lessons from the recent past and to build a new life on German soil. He wrote that the German anti-fascists, communicating closely with the SVAG workers and with people who had come to Germany through the "scorched earth" of their own country, had begun calling them simply friends. "Our Soviet friends," he stressed, "did not attempt to take advantage of their authority as an occupying power, but attempted only to provide the German cultural workers with every kind of assistance in the resolution of their own national task of reviving the humanistic culture. We discussed and debated, and if we had different opinions on a certain matter we found a common language.... We always talked as comrades in the party."⁷

The First Meetings With Marshal G.K. Zhukov

...Here I was in Berlin. I found the area of Karlshorst, where the headquarters and the Directorate of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany were located, on a city map (although this was not a very reliable guide in August of 1945), bypassed the central blocks, which were in ruins, and arrived at my new station. At that time Karlshorst had still not become synonymous with the Soviet command and the Soviet Military Administration in the minds of the German population. In subsequent months and years the Germans would frequently say "Karlshorst" and "these are orders from Karlshorst"... instead of the official SVAG.

After performing certain necessary formalities, I went to be received by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, chief of SVAG. Since I had never before worked under him, I remembered this first meeting, albeit a short one, well.

"I have already received reports on you," the marshal said. "Start setting up the Directorate and establish contact with German parties and organizations, especially the KPD and the SDPD, immediately. As far as I know, you are familiar with the main areas of work and control. I would add only that our people have already accomplished some things during the 3 months since 9 May, frequently at their own initiative. And they have done a fairly good job. Furthermore," G.K. Zhukov continued, "back at the end of the war, when we entered German territory, our unit and formation commanders were forced to engage in peaceable work in the cities and other communities, in order to secure their immediate rear area."

This work was carried out in accordance with the liberation nature of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War and with the objectives of the entire anti-Hitlerite coalition.

The democratically minded population became more active around the Soviet commandants.

I knew that Marshal G.K. Zhukov had precisely and concisely described the new tasks facing the Soviet Army immediately following the victory, at the first meeting of the aktiv of military communists of the Berlin Garrison in May of 1945:

"We took Berlin by storm, but we still have to fight for the souls of the Germans. This will be a difficult battle, and our forward edge now runs precisely through this area of work. I want to believe that a brilliant victory awaits us also on this front."

I not only knew about that struggle for the souls of the Germans, but I also had had a certain part in it even during the war as chief of the sections of the political directorates of a number of fronts for working among the enemy troops and population. Now, however, in Germany's postwar situation, this political work was being raised to the level of state tasks.

"Familiarize yourself with the existing experience," Marshal Zhukov said at the end of our meeting. "Assess the situation and use whatever is consistent with SVAG orders. We have only laid the foundation, of course. We now need to work with a clear perspective. Report to me a week from now on how the work is progressing and on the plan for immediate measures."

Ambassador A.A. Sobolev, political advisor to the chief, with whose organization I had established close contacts, was also present at that meeting.

Carrying out the marshal's instructions, my immediate assistants and I visited the commandant's offices near Berlin (Eberswalde, Potsdam and Teltow) in order to acquaint ourselves with their work. The main conclusion reached by us was to some degree already contained in the marshal's statements. Where interim mayors and other responsible officials of the agencies of local self-government appointed as military commandants were known as anti-fascists to the residents of the specific city, area or community, the creative activeness of the population was greater and the most urgent measures were being carried out better

than where everything was accomplished with orders alone. We also concluded that they should draw up orders and instructions, not to the detriment of the military authority of the commandants, in such a way that they would be understood by the German people themselves and motivate them to be more or less active in the implementation of those orders and instructions.

After I had familiarized myself somewhat with the situation and taken a look at life locally, there were meetings with leaders of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDPD).

Wilhelm Pieck received me in a very cordial and friendly manner. I had studied his works, in which he had warned of the danger of war (his report at the 10th Plenum of the IKKI [Executive Committee of the Communist International] in 1933, for example), while still at the Military Political Academy. During the war W. Pieck and I met in Moscow and at the Krasnogorsk German Prisoner-of-War Camp, where an anti-fascist school was functioning and where the National Free Germany Committee was formed in July of 1943. I believe that W. Pieck recalled me as one of many Soviet Army political workers whom he had met during the war.

During our first meeting in Germany W. Pieck told me about the communist party's work. He especially stressed the task of establishing close ties with members of the Social Democratic Party for achieving unity of operations and overcoming the schism in the German workers' movement. Speaking in Berlin on 19 September 1945, W. Pieck presented a very extensive formulation in speaking of the need for "combat unity of the Germany working class."⁸

The most sincere, comradely relations developed very rapidly between us. I keep as one of my most treasured relics his book "Reden und Aufsätze" [Speeches and Articles], which he gave me as a gift. It contained the following inscription:

"To my dear Sergey Ivanovich Tyul'panov in memory of the work we performed together....

3 January 1948

As a mark of friendship and respect,
W. Pieck"

I performed political work with Walter Ulbricht among the enemy forces on the Stalingrad Front. I understood from our conversation that he was devoting his main attention to the strengthening of the party organization of the KPD, which was deeply involved in the party's ideological rearmament in the new situation.

Contact was also established with Anton Ackermann, member of the Politburo of the KPD Central Committee, with whom I frequently met. We discussed the ideological reindoctrination of the population in the Soviet Occupation Zone. These were essentially ideological preparations for anti-fascist, democratic reforms.

It was more difficult to establish working ties with leaders of the SDPD. Conflicts raged in its central administration at that time. There was neither clarity nor unanimity on many issues there in August of 1945. This was especially true of problems involved in establishing first unity of action, and then unification with the communists into a single revolutionary party of the working class, dealings with the Soviet Union and the CPSU and with the Western powers, assessment of the lessons of German history and of the objective consequences of fascist Germany's defeat for the nation's future. Two lines of

thought were already taking shape, however: that supported by Otto Grotewohl, Max Fechner and Friedrich Ebert, on the one hand, and that of Kurt Schumacher, Erich Ollenhauer and Ernst Reuter, on the other.

Otto Grotewohl struck me first of all, I would say, with his courageous candor, with his desire to be certain of the correctness of his new views and to convince his comrades in the Social Democratic Party of their correctness. When he explained his ideas, it was as though he were testing his formulations in the relaxed discussion with me, although we were seeing each other for the first time and to him I was still the "Herr Oberst." I soon became his "Comrade Colonel," and then simply Sergey Ivanovich. He once admitted that at the very beginning he had considered a Soviet colonel to be no different than a colonel of the former German army or the armies of other nations.... In 2 or 3 months O. Grotewohl had firmly taken a position calling for a basic review of the social democracy's reformist positions. In his own words, which I remembered, he resolutely rejected "the reproduction of old errors."

During that same time the section chiefs of the Information Directorate established contact with German democratic officials, political parties and public organizations (these were permitted by an order issued by the chief of SVAG on 10 June 1945), including the Free German Labor Union Federation (FDGB), as well as the press, radio and cultural workers.

I made my report to Marshal G.K. Zhukov on 27 August. The first question the marshal asked me had to do with my meetings with Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Anton Ackermann and Otto Grotewohl (he listed them in this order). G.K. Zhukov listened carefully and ultracritically, I would say, to the report on the establishment of ties with leaders of the KPD and the SDPD, and with other political parties. He asked questions and demanded an assessment of specific facts and events.

My report apparently satisfied the marshal. This could be sensed in his comments. I should note that he valued not general discussions, but primarily actual deeds, specific decisions and basic conclusions for "operational actions" in the near future. The fact that I was already acquainted with W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht, A. Ackermann and many other leading officials in the communist party (particularly in the cultural field), as I have already stated, contributed to the success of that first report, which greatly determined my good relations with G.K. Zhukov, relations which continued in subsequent years, until his death. This was also true of certain other workers in the Information Directorate.

Later, Marshal Zhukov described the political situation in the Soviet Occupation Zone and in Germany as a whole in greater detail than he had at the first meeting. He especially stressed two aspects.

"In the first place, we must constantly rely on decisions of the Potsdam Conference in our work and stress faithfulness to the points agreed upon. At the same time, however, we must not count on the administrations of the Western powers to truly follow the Potsdam Agreements in their practical work. These decisions were a diplomatic victory for us. A fierce struggle surrounded them. Not many people know about it. Comrade Sobolev will brief you in greater detail. Our military victory has forced the Allies to adopt these principles, but it will be necessary to fight for their realization. In perspective we can say

that many officials in the military administrations of the Allies are opponents of Potsdam. They cannot openly depart from those decisions at this time, however.

"In the second place, we need to get the German population to understand that it is in the German people's interest for the Potsdam decisions to be carried out, and that departing from the decisions will be to their detriment. Consequently, the Germans have an interest in fulfilling the demands agreed upon by the powers in the anti-Hitlerite coalition, and we must draw them over to our side. Do not tire of reminding the Germans of the basic tenet from Comrade Stalin's order of 23 February 1942 that Hitlerites come and go, but the German people and the German state will remain."

It should be mentioned that at that time, in violation of the Potsdam agreements and contrary to the national interests of the German people themselves, the Western powers had already begun implementing a policy of dividing Germany little by little, of gradually merging their zones economically and administratively and creating a separate West German state, which they subsequently remilitarized and took into their own aggressive bloc, which was directed against the Soviet Union and the developing world socialist system.

I can frankly say that many of us did not understand the acuteness of the difficulty and even the real danger posed for the Soviet Union by that policy which our Western allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition had already begun implementing at the end of the war, and especially after the war. (until the West openly went over to the "cold war" following Churchill's speech at Fulton in the spring of 1946). Meetings of the Allied Control Council and its directorates, which I attended, the discussion of issues, the arguments and counter-arguments reflected the gradual build-up of that tension which was beginning to characterize relations between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union. When one examines documents from those years, it becomes apparent that our state had to put forth enormous efforts at that time to protect the peace and prevent the "cold" war from developing into a new "hot" war.

The instructions with which Marshal G.K. Zhukov attended my "introduction to the position" contained information on the general work performed by SVAG, which was so essential to the Directorate, as well as a description of the immediate tasks. They were not given in the form of an order. Marshal Zhukov, a military man from head to toes, as they say, had to learn to handle his new position as chief of the Soviet Military Administration. As a regular military political worker, I also had to take this "restructuring" into account. Subsequently, I became convinced over and over again that the marshal was rapidly grasping the "multi-factor" situation, to put it in modern terms, and was making far-sighted socioeconomic and political decisions, taking their immediate and long-range consequences into account.

Today, from the positions of the 1980's, when the GDR is a sovereign German state constituting a socialist nation with a developed industry and agriculture and with a high level of culture, the historical phases in the emergence and development of this state are clearly apparent. And it is no longer easy to realistically imagine, to experience, the entire dramatic intensity and the incredible difficulty of the initial period of shaping the future state of workers

and peasants and carrying out anti-fascist reforms on German soil, not yet purified of the effects of the nazis' monstrous dominion. It was necessary not only to raise the cities out of the ruins and restore the elementary conditions necessary for the people's vital activities, but also to effect a basic restructuring of the minds of millions of Germans poisoned by the toxin of Nazism.

The Tasks of the Information Directorate

The agencies of SVAG as a whole and the Information Directorate particularly were charged by the Soviet government with the task of systematically implementing the Potsdam decisions with respect to Germany, which have already been discussed. At the time we usually referred to them as the "three D's": democratization, denazification and demilitarization.

The purely military disarmament was carried out relatively rapidly and simply. Germany's military-economic disarmament was far more difficult. The accomplishment of denazification and democratization was especially difficult, since they affected the principles underlying the social and state structure, the ideology and mass awareness, requiring fundamental reform of these.

The Information Directorate in Berlin, the information sections which were soon set up in the districts and provinces, and the instructors in the commandant's offices were the agencies for exerting political and ideological influence upon the German population (and naturally, the organizational influence inseparably linked with this). They were expected to monitor and to some degree, also to direct, the course of denazification and democratization. As the Directorate chief, I conducted service conferences for organizing the purposive functioning of all elements in that system, at which the main directions and principles of our work with the German population were explained. Subsequently, "at times of breakthrough," the chiefs of SVAG issued instructions at my request at conferences of leading workers in the Information Directorate throughout the zone-- Marshal G.K. Zhukov (March, 1946--at a unifying congress of the KPD and the SDPD), Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy (1948, during the so-called "blockade" of West Berlin) and Army General V.I. Chuykov (in May of 1949, on the eve of the convocation of the 3rd German People's Congress for the Unification of Germany and a Just Peace).

We were constantly aware of and stressed the basic difference between the occupation carried out by the Soviet Union and the occupation policy of the Western powers. Incidentally, W. Pieck stressed this in one of his articles: "The German working people have a friend in the Soviet occupation power."⁹

The basic principles which we followed in our work could be generally defined in the following manner: The Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War against fascist Germany and World War II waged by the anti-Hitlerite coalition as a whole had the objective of destroying fascism and eliminating its roots, all that which was linked with the nazi regime's dominion. On the basis of this, we needed to thoroughly think out also the extremely extensive formulation of the Potsdam decisions and all of the practical conclusions to which they led. Fascist Germany's unconditional surrender, the breaking up and banning of all Nazi organizations, and the elimination of the fascist state system--this was the first and the decisive step on the path of totally removing the adherents and activists

of the Hitlerite institutions from public life. It was essential to prevent them from "adapting" to the new conditions, to eliminate their ideological influence upon the population and prevent them from "altering their image." The reactionary forces, the forces of German imperialism, had been crushed or had gone into the underground. They existed, however, and were waiting for their time to come. Just as the Goebells propaganda comforted the Germans after the defeat at Stalingrad with the words "after December, May will return," once again, despite the defeat, those forces were counting on revenge. This was indicated, among other things, by instances of sabotage against the land reform, the intimidation of the peasants, and other acts. We could not afford to underestimate the effect which fascism had had on the consciousness and the mental attitude of the Germans. This was making it difficult to expose active nazis, SS troops and members of the Gestapo. We had to bear in mind the fact that German reaction had allies also in the reactionary circles of international imperialism. Certain Wehrmacht formations had been preserved in the British Zone, for example. American General Patton so blatantly left many fascists in Bavaria's system that General Eisenhower was forced to dismiss him.

We Soviet Army officers, I constantly reminded the Directorate workers, are engaged in a war under new circumstances for the ultimate elimination of facism, for an anti-fascist, peace-loving and democratic government, against that same enemy which we fought for 4 years. The most important thing is that all of our work of destroying and eliminating the roots of fascism and our effort to prevent disguised nazis from penetrating into local agencies of authority, and that sort of thing, must be closely linked with the creative aspect of our work--with our assistance and cooperation with German democratic organizations and the new agencies of local authority which are coming into being.

It was not necessary to explain the importance and the necessity of providing every possible sort of assistance to the KPD in the cities and districts and at the enterprises to the officers in the SVAG Information Directorate (they were all members of the CPSU, and the party organization therefore played a very large role). Contacts were maintained at all levels, from top to bottom. There was ordinarily no mental barrier in the relations of our workers with the communist party organizations or the individual KPD members. The need to work together with the members of the Social Democratic Party and with the bourgeois parties--the Christian Democratic Alliance (KhDS) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPG)--demanded a certain internal restructuring, however. First of all, it was necessary to overcome a deeply rooted distrust of the Social Democrats, knowing that not all of their preconceptions and prejudices toward the communists, the Soviet Union and the Russian had been eliminated at that time. We needed to bear in mind the fact that by its historical past and its basic social makeup the SDPD was a workers' party and that the communists were striving to create with the Social Democrats a single proletarian party on a revolutionary basis.

In general, it was difficult and delicate political work to combine control and assistance in the anti-fascist, democratic reorganization, to combine vigilance and trust for those members of the social democratic and bourgeois parties who were sincerely engaging in the building of a new life.

As I explained the general principles of the CPSU and the Soviet government in the German question and the practical tasks of Directorate political workers, I especially underscored the fact that since it was reinforcing our victory over fascism, this work was of enormous state importance. Although our work was not limited to this by far, the idea was near and clear to all the officers, who had borne the hardships and bitterness of the war. The need to consolidate the dearly earned victory justified the delay in their return home, to a peaceful life at home, in a homeland devastated by the fascists. For the SVAG workers the liberation nature of our work and the need to rid the German people of fascism and materialism and to give them true democracy were an important incentive to perform vigorous, creative organizational and political and ideological work. It became more and more significant and convincing as anti-fascist, democratic reforms were carried out in the Soviet Zone. It was reinforced also by the rebirth of the old institutions in the public life of the Western zones, which essentially meant the restoration of the positions of German imperialism's reactionary forces there.

The most noteworthy thing was the fact that the work aimed at creating a democratic, peace-loving Germany was our patriotic task, on the one hand, and on the other, it was totally in keeping with the basic interests of the working German people liberated from fascism and was therefore an international, proletarian-socialist task.

I subsequently answered questions posed by the German friends more than once, especially the young ones, who were trying to understand what had motivated the Soviet people to work with such selflessness and vigor in Germany following the war to restore its economy, to see to the schools, help with the publication of books and textbooks, and promote the revival of the German culture. I always told them candidly that it had not been easy for our people--communists and patriots of the Soviet Union. Many of them had lost their families and their health during the war and had crossed thousands of kilometers of native land scorched by the enemy. And if that class, psychological reorientation toward a conquered and at the same time, liberated, people occurred very rapidly, this was because it had deep ideological and historical roots. I went on to tell about our Marxist-Leninist ideology, the internationalist indoctrination of our people and the historical traditions of ties with the German workers' movement, as well as with the German anti-fascists--mainly the communists--during the war.

Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs: "Proceeding on the basis of their international duty and their humane convictions, the Communist Party and the Soviet government took every possible step to promptly explain to the Soviet fightingmen who was the real cause of the war and of the crimes which were committed. Never was there thought of punishing the working German people for those crimes which the fascists had committed in our country. The Soviet people took a clearly defined position with respect to the German workers: They had to be helped to recognize their errors, to rapidly root out the remnants of Nazism and merge into the common family of liberated peoples, whose most noble slogan in the future should be one of peace and democracy."¹⁰

In the course of their practical work the Information Directorate workers--both the veterans and the young ones--learned how to implement the class, internationalist line, specifically and systematically. Officers-and-political workers,

who had acquired experience in working among enemy troops during the war, comprised an absolute majority of the Directorate workers. Prior to the war many of them had been instructors in the social disciplines at VUZ's or secondary schools, graduate students or specialists beginning their careers in various fields of culture--as writers, musicians, museum or library workers. A small group was made up of regular officers-and-political workers who knew the German language, as well as party workers.

My first deputy was Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Zdorov, a regular officer, an extremely calm and cautious worker and a veteran organizer, who thoroughly weighed his own acts and the actions of others. He subsequently served many years in political organs of the Soviet Army. One of the most important sections--the political parties section--was headed by Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Nazarov, who knew Germany well. He skilfully directed the work of the advisors, who maintained constant contact with the leadership of the parties. There was also a section which worked with trade unions.

Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Beydin enjoyed special prestige in the section which worked with the youth. He was well known by Erich Honecker, Herman Axen, Paul Ferner and other current leaders of the SED. This is what E. Honecker writes of him and other comrades, for example: "Many Soviet communists, including such officers as I. Beydin, deserve a great deal of credit for the development of our youth movement. Their knowledge of the job, their bearing and their comradely treatment and friendly help made a big impression on me.... Many communists and Komsomol members of the Soviet Army helped our young, still inexperienced friends with great sensitivity in their words and deeds. Thanks to the direct contact with such people, many young men and women rid themselves of anti-communist and anti-Soviet prejudices."¹¹

Lieutenant Colonel P.S. Lyul'ko, chief of the section which worked with local agencies of German self-government, performed an important job. Prior to the war he had worked in Soviet administrative agencies and skilfully given of his expertise to the German comrades. Captain A.A. Morozov, chief of my "little staff," performed efficiently. He saw to it that every single suggestion from the workers in the information sections in the states and every single letter from a German citizen (not to speak of the German public organizations) received attention and a response.

The cultural section was headed by Lieutenant Colonel A.L. Dymshits, doctor of philological sciences, professor and specialist in the history of German literature. The functions of that section included working with the creative intelligentsia, writers, artists, actors and all other workers in the arts, and providing them with necessary assistance. This task, along with those of the other Directorate sections, was performed both directly (the licensing of theater and motion picture organizations, the establishment of clubs for the intelligentsia, encouragement of the functioning of creative organizations) and through the democratic parties and trade unions operating in the Soviet Zone. This work left good memories with members of the Cultural League for Germany's Democratic Restoration, directors and artists of the DEFA film studio, members of the German-Soviet Friendship Organization, and other such organizations.

It was the task of the press section to monitor and assist publishers and editorial offices of newspapers and magazines established at the initiative of the German public--specifically, to issue licenses and help obtain paper. The section studied the moral-political effect of a specific work and publicized Soviet creative literature through the press. I still have letters from German authors and editors expressing gratitude for the attention given to their work. The Directorate also helped the German democratic broadcasting system a great deal.

Workers with the oral propaganda section explained to the German population the tasks and functions of SVAG and orders issued by its chief, and publicized the Soviet Union's policy on the German question. Lectures presented to expose fascism and explain the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory met with considerable response among the population. A great deal of attention was devoted to acquainting broad groups of the German community with life in the Soviet Union and with its achievements. The task of the lecturers also included--and increasingly, as time went on--that of exposing the anti-Potsdam, divisive policy of the Western powers.

The Information Directorate also had a censorship section. Its task was one of monitoring all German publications to see that they conformed to the Potsdam Agreement.¹² The limits of authority of our censorship workers were also defined by the democratic requirements. It was the task of the censors to eliminate nazi and anti-democratic remnants and anti-Soviet prejudices encountered in individual statements. They thus also had an indoctrinational and explanatory function. Members of the KhDS and the LDPG, who had taken a firm position on the side of the anti-fascist, democratic order with its socialist orientation, stated repeatedly in 1949 that they recalled "their censors" with gratitude, regarding them more as assistants and teachers than as rigid controllers.

I have only schematically outlined the tasks of the Directorate sections, of course. Life was constantly bringing up new questions, which frequently could not be broken down into ideology and economics, "a high level of culture" or daily life, into specific problems of the intelligentsia or common tasks of the anti-fascist, democratic revolution. The Directorate sections for working with parties, with agencies of German self-government, with trade unions and with the youth, and the cultural section therefore always coordinated their work with one another and frequently, with other SVAG sections and directorates.

SVAG's public education section, which was staffed with experienced Soviet public education workers (mainly secondary school teachers and VUZ instructors), operated in close contact with our Directorate. It exercised general ideological control through its branching system and provided every sort of support for the new school's normal functioning. SVAG's public education section and the Information Directorate were very cautious in their specific recommendations for developing and improving education in the German school. The German comrades had the final say, since there was complete unity between SVAG and the German anti-fascists on basic political issues. Veteran communist Paul Wandel headed the German Central Public Education Directorate. It was also apparent that a revolution in the spiritual life would require broad participation by all democratic political parties in the process.

SVAG's daily newspaper for the German population, TAGLICHE RUNDSCHAU (YEZHEDNEVNOYE OBOZRENIYE, of which Colonel A.V. Kirsanov was responsible editor), which began publication on 15 May 1945, was also a part of the Information Directorate system. The newspaper SOVETSKOYE SLOVO (Colonel N.A. Bubnov, responsible editor) was published for the SVAG workers. It frequently carried articles by our workers on events in Germany.

The information sections of the Soviet Military Administration's directorates for the provinces and states and under the Soviet Commandant's Office in Berlin had staffs of 25-30 people. Their structure generally conformed to that of our Directorate. There were instructors in the military commandant's offices of the cities and large communities. The Germans ordinarily called them "culture-officers," as they did the other workers in the information system.

Soviet workers on the culture and ideology front were given high ratings in many speeches and articles not only by leaders of the SED--W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht and O. Grotewohl--but also by officials in other parties--O. Nuschke, W. Kultz, I. Diekman, L. Woltz and E. Goldenbaum. I shall cite just one statement about them: The Soviet officers, wrote the above-mentioned S. Doernberg "always helped to overcome the lethargy, disorder and political passivity widespread in the population. Wherever they were active, they helped to revive and promote the development of political initiative, a sense of national responsibility and democratic state awareness in the German people."¹³

Like-Minded People

I have already stated that from the very beginning Marshal G.K. Zhukov directed me to establish the closest of contacts with leaders of the KPD and the SDPD.

Just before the Soviet Army entered Germany I attended a conference of political workers in Moscow. Prominent figures in the international communist movement G. Dimitrov, W. Pieck and D.Z. Manuil'skiy spoke at the conference. They reminded the representatives of political organs of the Soviet Army of decisions coming out of the 7th Congress of the Communist International (1935) and the Brussels Conference of the KPD, held the same year. Those reports outlined the basic line of our conduct in territories liberated by the Soviet Army and directed us to work together not just with the communists, but also with everyone combatting fascism and fighting for peace, democracy and social progress.¹⁴

Directorate workers established the closest of ties and information exchange with leaders of the KPD rapidly and without difficulty. Caution, however, or even an element of distrust, with respect to members of the SDPD, were rooted not only in the historical past of that party as a whole, but also partly in the former position held by certain of those officials who had now become proponents of uniting the working class. The life which we encountered, however, and the political figures of the SDPD with whom we became acquainted, forced us to take a more differentiated approach to that party, which was heterogenous in composition, ideology and practices, and to its members.

Throughout October and December of 1945 I regularly reported to Marshal G.K. Zhukov on the political moods of members of the communist and Social Democratic

parties, in order first to unite their actions and then to merge them organizationally on a Marxist-Leninist basis. I also reported on the opponents of that unification in our zone and the Western zones and on the exacerbated class struggle. I recall one of those reports, made in the presence of political advisor A.A. Sobolev and Lieutenant General K.F. Telegin, member of the Military Council of the Group of Forces. Preparations were underway for a joint conference of leading figures in the KPD and the SDPD, which became known in the history of the SED as the "conference of the sixty" (30 people from each party), to discuss matters pertaining to their unification. The marshal pointed out to me the special political complexity of that issue.

In the following months the movement of the party masses of the KPD and the SDPD to unite the two workers' parties on a revolutionary basis developed in both the Soviet and the Western zones to the level of direct action. There was simultaneously a drastic increase in the activeness of the foes of unification, headed by right-wing Social Democrat Kurt Schumacher, who had created his own office in Hannover (in the British Zone) as a counterbalance to the SDPD Administration in Berlin. The military administrations of the Western powers switched to a direct ban on the movement to unite the workers' parties, creating obstacles not only on a national German scale through the Control Council, but also in the states and provinces under their control.

The situation became even more acute in February of 1946, especially after K. Schumacher rejected a proposal by the proponents of unity, led by O. Grotewohl, to convene an all-German SDPD congress.

During those weeks our Directorate workers carefully followed all events on the "unification front," as we called it, all the difficulties experienced by the proponents of unification, and all instances of opposition to it. We received information every day on Schumacher's agents infiltrated from the Western zones into West Berlin and on the new arguments (and old ones, of course, since some people still believed them) put forth by our enemies. All of this information was processed by a special group led by Lieutenant Colonel Parkhomenko. The conclusions were reported to our local agencies. They were differentiated for the separate states, because the process of unification was not developing identically everywhere.¹³ We also promptly reported our observations to the KPD Central Committee (Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Frantz Dalem and Anton Ackermann) and the SDPD Central Committee (Otto Grotewohl, Max Fechner and Helmut Lehmann). We were prepared to do everything possible to help realize the joint line taken by the KPD and the SDPD to unite them in the ranks of a Marxist-Leninist party.

In view of all the difficulties of the situation Marshal G.K. Zhukov considered it necessary to meet personally with Wilhelm Pieck and O. Grotewohl, in order to receive "firsthand" information.

W. Pieck and O. Grotewohl, totally in agreement with each other, spoke out for accelerating the process of unification, since only on the basis of unity of the working class would it be possible to effect a basic democratic revolution and solidify the anti-fascist, democratic bloc of parties.

O. Grotewohl reported on K. Schumacher's divisive actions and on the difficulties in the work of the proponent of unification in the Western occupied zones and the

western sectors of Berlin. He also stressed the need to step up the ideological work in the Soviet Zone in order to overcome doubts and hesitations among the Soviet Democratic activists at the district level, newspaper editors and other party officials. O. Grotewohl gave special attention to that group, since, unlike them, the rank-and-file members of the SDPD were advocating unification more resolutely. He stated frankly that he was being forced to sever relations with certain comrades with whom he had developed friendly relations as a result of past, joint party work and difficulties experienced together, and this was not easy. It was the same situation for many other activists, for whom such ties were far stronger than for the rank-and-file Social Democrats.

After listening to the reports from W. Pieck and O. Grotewohl, Marshal Zhukov had the following to say:

"Comrade Pieck, I have known you a long time, but Grotewohl is a new comrade for me. I want to say to you, Comrade Grotewohl, that I am a soldier and not a diplomat. Both as a soldier and as a marshal I will tell you frankly that I value your determination in making such a responsible decision, which weighs and thoroughly considers the difficulties and does not retreat before them. I value your position and your work.... I am confident," G.K. Zhukov underscored, "that our joint task of creating a genuinely (the marshal stressed this word) democratic Germany can only gain from the founding of the SED. You can always count on my support and my help...."

Zhukov paused and then stood up.

Officials such as Schumacher, Hermes¹⁶ and others are the enemies of systematic democratic reforms.

That same evening (or rather that night) after W. Pieck and O. Grotewohl had left, a report on the meeting was sent to I.V. Stalin in Moscow.

O. Grotewohl later told me that Marshal Zhukov had made a big impression on him. "The marshal is wrong when he says that he is not a diplomat, however," he said. "The precision and determination of his statements--which means also, his decisions--if I am not mistaken, are what constitutes the difference between a Soviet diplomat and a bourgeois diplomat, who frequently attempts to conceal his true intentions. I think that all of the SVAG's work, which is directed by Marshal Zhukov, is an index of skilful diplomacy."

In the difficult struggle to create the Social Unity Party of Germany we got to know many leaders of the Social Democrats better, and they got to know us better. It was not just Otto Grotewohl, with whom I was soon linked by ties of strong friendship continuing up to his death in 1964, who made a big impression on me personally.¹⁷ I shall always remember Otto Buchwitz, a veteran of the German workers' movement, who amazed everyone who knew him with his modesty, his dependability in the fulfillment of any assignment from the SED, of which he was one of the founders, and with the sincerity of his personal and public conduct. Friedrich Ebert amazed me with his courageous and resolute break with the past--not just with his own past, but also with the "family history."¹⁸

During the celebration of O. Buchwitz' 70th birthday, W. Pieck, O. Grotewohl and I were sitting at the same table with him. Following a complimentary speech, in which I noted the large role played by the birthday celebrant's personal qualities for overcoming a certain restraint on the part of the Soviet people toward the SDPD, when the peacetime work in Germany had just begun, Otto Buchwitz made the following statement:

"It was necessary also for you to understand how difficult it was for the older members of our party to part even with the name 'Social Democratic Party of Germany.' I began my political career when August Bebel was playing a leading role in it. I knew Frantz Mering personally and belonged to that wing of the party which was fighting conciliation with the bourgeoisie and defending the interests of the working class."

O. Buchwitz later told about this in his book "50 Years as an Active Member of the German Workers' Movement," which was translated into Russian.

The celebration took place in an atmosphere of exceptional warmth, and the speeches by W. Pieck and O. Grotewohl, each in his own style, were, as always, of profound content and imbued with a sense of sincere respect and love for the birthday celebrant.

There were many exciting moments in the process of uniting the two workers' parties, which were perceived differently by the participants in the events because they reflected individual experience and diverse paths in life. For example, I was deeply moved by the simple words uttered by Eugen Ernst, an old official in the Social Democratic Party of Germany (he was 82 years old) at a joint conference of Berlin organizations of the KPD and the SDPD: "We have finally found each other."¹⁹ This was perhaps no less impressive than the historic handshake of W. Pieck and O. Grotewohl at a unification conference held several days later, which became a symbol of the unity of the German working class.

April of 1946, when the unification of German's Workers' movement was effected on a revolutionary basis and the SED was established in Berlin, would never be forgotten by us Soviet people who had contributed to that achievement. I remember the May Day demonstrations that year, as though it were today. Thousands of workers, with no adornment or festive mood, marched along the streets of Berlin, Dresden and many other cities. Working people, who had languished for years in concentration camps and prisons, who had gone hungry, suffered from work beyond their strength and from the hardships of war, and aged prematurely, now carried slogans appealing for a new life against a backdrop of ruins. At that time many Germans still regarded Hitlerite Germany's defeat as a catastrophe. Thousands of people stood on the sidewalks, including thousands of former nazis ("in name" or "convinced" nazis) and former members of the Hitlerjugend. Some of them stood with hands clasped helplessly, others with heads bowed dejectedly. They stood and watched--sometimes impassively, without apparent curiosity. There were many women in mourning, in old, worn dresses. And it was necessary to fight for all of them, because without their participation it would be impossible to restore elementary living conditions, not to speak of building a new life on German soil.

The column of the Berlin proletariat was headed by Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl and Walter Ulbricht; the "three whiteheads"--Herman Matern, Otto Buchwitz and

Kurt Fischer--marched in the column of workers in Dresden; Gustav Sobbotka marched with the workers in Schwerin; Friedrich Ebert, in Potsdam; and Werner Eggerat, in Weimar. Frantz Dalem, Helmut Lehman, Max Fechner, Paul Merker, Anton Ackerman, Karl Lidke, Otto Mayer, Erich Honecker, Herman Axon and many other prominent figures in the German workers' movement marched in the columns of the working class. Holding one another firmly by the hand, they marched beneath the slogan--so simple but so full of meaning and important: "Unity"! I also saw a symbolic transparency depicting a magnet, at the poles of which stood the letters KPD and DSPD.

Summing up the struggle to overcome the schism in the German workers' movement and to create the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, I would like to say something about the personal qualities of Wilhelm Pieck, chairman of the KPD Central Committee, whom I had the opportunity to get to know as we worked together.

Not a single significant social and economic reform occurred in the Soviet Occupation Zone, in which W. Pieck did not take a direct part or for which he did not provide the theoretical or the practical justification. W. Pieck's role was especially strongly manifested in the establishment of the SED. Many difficulties encountered on the way were overcome thanks to his tireless efforts.

What main quality in his work gave W. Pieck as an individual such prestige, and not just as the leader of the working class, but also as the champion of the truly national interests of the German people?

In the first place, it was a result of his entire life as a revolutionary. During his entire life he never once retreated when defending the program and the specific demands of the working class. He taught it the strategy and tactics of class struggle and exposed the class nature of reformism and its theoretical tenets disguised as objectivity. When analyzing any period in the development of capitalism (whether it was a crisis or an upsurge, a depression or a recovery), he demonstrated the importance of Marxist-Leninist theory and defended the purity of the Marxist outlook. Life confirmed the correctness of his "political orientation"--if not immediately, then with time--and this contributed to the growth of his personal prestige. Wilhelm Pieck was a loyal continuer of the revolutionary traditions laid down by August Bebel, Frantz Mering, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, and Ernest Telmann, and took his rightful place in the ranks of those prominent figures of the German workers' movement.

In the second place, by appealing to the Social Democrats and communists to engage in a vigorous joint struggle against monopolistic capital, both before the nazis seized power and during the period 1933-1941, W. Pieck earned the undoubted respect of the Social Democratic workers and the intelligentsia. Despite the great influence of the nazi and the Social Democratic press, they believed in W. Pieck and were convinced of his political honesty. This proved to be very important to the entire process of unification and the overcoming of anti-communist prejudices.

In the third place, W. Pieck's prestige rose thanks to his comradely treatment of the wavering Social Democrats. He patiently explained things and refuted incorrect premises of the erring opponents to the unification of the working class

and the creation of a unified socialist party. I had the opportunity to attend his talks with a group of Social Democratic activists, with a group of rank-and-file members of the Social Democratic Party and finally, with members of the Social Democratic intelligentsia, and I always admired his ability to differentiate an issue as applicable to different audiences while at the same time not committing the slightest deviation from Marxist-Leninist positions. This is why W. Pieck, with complete justification, went down in the history of the German workers' movement as the "father of unity."

In the fourth place, a lot of the credit for strengthening the democratic bloc of parties and organizations belongs to W. Pieck. In debates with bourgeois leaders of the KhDS and the LDPG, which constituted a form of political struggle, he was able to demonstrate those common issues of national importance in which the policy of those parties and that of the SED coincided. He knew how to find a "common language" with them, which objectively strengthened the positions of the working class and the more progressive elements of the other social strata in those bourgeois parties. The bourgeois figures, even those openly hostile, rated highly W. Pieck's tact and his ability to reject their plans or amendments to the basic laws consolidating the nature of the anti-fascist social system and to expose the insolvency of their arguments and their covert encouragement of the reactionary forces, "without giving offense." Certain figures in the bourgeois parties in the Soviet Zone told me: "It is difficult to argument with him, even though I do not agree with his conception."

In the fifth place, W. Pieck's work during the period of unification of the two workers' parties, during the formation of Germany's national front and following the founding of the GDR, is characterized by extremely broad personal contacts with the mass of the working population. W. Pieck's ideological influence was determined by the fact that he constantly studied "living life" and its contradictions, drawing his arguments from this study. One evening in May of 1946, at his apartment, he showed me numerous letters submitted at a recent meeting. He considered it necessary to answer all those letters thoroughly and convincingly, in order thereby to enlist even more allies for the building of a new life.

FOOTNOTES

1. VEDOMOSTI KONTROL'NOGO SOVETA V GERMANII, special issue, Berlin, 1946, p 7.
2. Ibid., p 10.
3. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny" [The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War], Vol III, Moscow, 1947, p 339.
4. The latest publication of this kind is the collection from Kulturbund: "...einer neuen Zeit Beginn. Erinnerungen an die Anfänge unserer Kulturrevolution 1945-1949" [The Beginning of a New Era: Recollections on the Beginning of our Cultural Revolution of 1945-1949], Berlin-Weimar, 1980.

For information on the work of SVAG and its assistance in the establishment of the anti-fascist, democratic system, read, among other publications, the following: "Istoriya GDR [History of the GDR], 2nd edition, Moscow, 1982; S. Doernberg, "Befreiung 1945. Ein Augenzeugenbericht" [The Liberation of 1945: Eyewitness Account], Berlin, 1975; "Einheit--im Kampfe geboren. Beiträge zum 30. Jahrestag der Befreiung vom Faschismus" [Unity--Born in the

Struggle: Contributions to the 30th Anniversary of the Liberation from Fascism], Berlin, 1975; "Friendship in Deed: Documents on the Fraternal Assistance Provided by the Soviet Military Organs in Dresden After the Liberation From Fascism" in "Jahrbuch der Geschichte Dresdens" [Yearbook of Dresden's History], Dresden, 1975; R. Engelhardt and M. Wille, "Freundschaft in Aktion. Quellen zur Zusammenarbeit Sowjetischer und deutscher Genossen bei der Errichtung der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Ordnung im Bezirk Magdeburg (1945-1949). Zur Zusammenarbeit der SMA mit den von der KPD geführten antifaschistischen Kräften in der Provinz Sachsen im Jahr der Befreiung" [Friendship in Action: Sources of Joint Soviet-German Work to Establish an anti-fascist, democratic order in the District of Magdeburg (1945-1949) and of the Joint Work of the SMA with the Anti-Fascist Forces Led by the KPD in the Province of Sachsen During the Year of the Liberation], Magdeburg, 1975; L. Kolm, "Die Befehle des Obersten Chefs der Sowjetischen Militäradministration in Deutschland 1945-1949: Eine analytische Untersuchung. Diss." [Orders of the Supreme Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, 1945-1949: An Analytical Investigation. Thesis], Berlin, 1977; "Die Entwicklung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der UdSSR" [The Development of Friendly Relations Between the GDR and the USSR], Berlin, 1977; "Die ersten Jahre. Erinnerungen an den Beginn der revolutionären Umgestaltungen" [The First Years: Recollections of the Beginning of the Revolutionary Reform], Berlin, 1979.

5. S. Doernberg, "Kurze Geschichte der DDR" [A Brief History of the GDR], Berlin, 1969. Cited from the Russian translation of S. Doernberg's "A Brief History of the GDR," 2nd, enlarged, edition, Moscow, 1971, pp 36-37.
6. Ibid., p 39.
7. "...einer neun..." op. cit., pp 62-63.
8. W. Pieck, "Reden und Aufsätze" [Speeches and Articles], a selection, Berlin, 1948, p 79.
9. Ibid., Vol 2, Berlin, 1952, p 203.
10. G.K. Zhukov in the work mentioned, Vol 2, p 326.
11. E. Honecker, "Iz moey zhizni" [Out of My Life], Moscow, 1982, pp 116-117.
12. For information on this read G.Ya. Rudoy, "The First Steps of the Postwar German Democratic Press" in NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, No 1, 1970.
13. S. Doernberg, "The Work of the Soviet Military Administration--German-Soviet Friendship in Action" in "Zwei Jahrzehnte deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen 1945-1965" [Two Decades of German-Soviet Relations--1945-1965], Berlin, 1965, p 40.
14. I told in greater detail about the reception of the group of responsible political workers of the Soviet Army at the VKP(b) All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee on the eve of the crossing of the state border of the USSR, in an article included in the book "...einer neuen Zeit Beginn," pp 513-516.
15. For a more detailed account of this read S.I. Tul'panov, "Thoughts on the Party Unification Day of the SED in 1948," ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT, No 5, p 620.

16. Hermes was one of the leaders of the Christian Democratic League in the Soviet Zone. The marshal was apparently referring to all the opponents of democratic reforms, irrespective of their party affiliation.
17. Following O. Grotewohl's death his wife Johanna wrote the following in connection with my reports in Moscow and Leningrad at community meetings held in memory of O. Grotewohl: "I can well imagine how you, dear Sergey Ivanovich, in your vital and heart-touching manner, described Otto Grotewohl to your audience not just as a comrade and politician, but as a man. You had the opportunity to get to know him in the most diverse situations. Otto felt a friendly attachment to you from the very beginning and was always grateful to you when you helped him with your expertise and political know-how, with words and deeds, during the difficult undertakings, in the work of turning our country into a socialist state." (Letter from J. Grotewohl, 22 April 1974, from the author's archives).
18. F. Ebert's father, subsequently a member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee, was chairman of the SDPD during World War I and later chairman of the so-called "Council of People's Delegates" and president of Germany during the period 1918-1925.
19. DEUTSCHE VOLKSZEITUNG, 6 April 1946.

(Conclusion to follow)

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

NATO WATER-CROSSING MEANS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Apr 84 p 3

[Article by Engr-Col A. Malyshev and Col (Ret) A. Kozhukhar': "Pontoon Parks"; from materials in the foreign press]

[Text] In elaborating plans and methods for the conduct of combat operations in various theaters of military operations, representatives of the NATO military leadership are devoting considerable attention to problems in crossing various natural and artificial water obstacles. Cited as arguments are cases from the experience in conducting combat operations in the Near East and Southeast Asia. The conclusion which is drawn here is reduced to one thing--it is necessary to make more active work on improving existing equipment and creating fundamentally new crossing equipment.

According to data in the "Jane's" reference book, the ground forces of the NATO countries have combat and transport vehicles capable of crossing water obstacles independently. They include amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers which move across the water either through the rotation of wheels and tracks (for example, American Sheridan light tanks or the V-300 Commando armored personnel carriers) or using hydropropulsion motors--screw propellers or hydro-jets (the British Stalwart multipurpose vehicle, the French Panar, ERC-90, and AMX-10RC armored personnel carriers). A number of heavy armored vehicles are equipped with removable individual kits of pneumatic floats or special panels which increase the reserve buoyancy. For example, such kits are employed on the Marder combat vehicle (FRG) and Chieftain and Scorpion tanks (Great Britain). Some modern tanks--the M60A2 (U.S.) and AMX-30 (France)--are equipped with a kit for submerged driving and can cross a river along the bottom.

However, foreign military specialists note, the capabilities for combat and transport vehicles to force water obstacles independently are limited. Thus, heavy armored vehicles equipped with a kit for submerged driving can cross water obstacles only with sufficiently hard dirt on the bottom, gently sloping banks, a weak current, and a depth of no more than four meters. The majority of the combat and transport vehicles equipped with individual removable kits for movement afloat or which possess buoyancy which is structurally imparted to them can cross rivers and canals independently only with a speed of current of no more than 1-1.2 meters per second. Moreover, the ground forces are equipped with a great amount of combat and transport equipment which is not adapted for crossing

water obstacles independently. Therefore, military experts believe that in the future special crossing equipment will not only have not lost its significance, but will play a determining role.

Of all the types of crossing equipment, foreign specialists especially distinguish pontoon parks which permit the crossing of wide water obstacles by virtually any troop loads. The advantages of such crossings include their great traffic capacity.

Non-self-propelled pontoon parks, for example the M4T6 and T5 (United States) and classes 30 and 80 (Great Britain) continue to remain in the inventory of the army ground forces of the capitalist states. They are sets of elements for the assembly of floating bridges and ferries with a carrying capacity of up to 40-60 tons. All this equipment is transported on conventional heavy-cargo transport vehicles (5-7 tons).

According to the evaluation of foreign military experts, such pontoon parks do not satisfy contemporary requirements: they have designs of various types, contain a large number of sectional units in their sets, and require significant personnel and time for the establishment of ferry and bridge crossings. Thus, the laying of floating bridges from elements of organizational non-self-propelled pontoon parks is accomplished at a rate of 50 running meters per hour. The assembly of ferries for the crossing of tanks by a crew of 40-50 men takes from 1.5-2.5 hours. In order to deliver one park set to a water obstacle several dozen cargo vehicles are required.

The equipping of NATO troops with self-propelled pontoon parks (the American MFAB-F, French MAB, West German M2) did not completely solve the problem.

The rate of crossing over these bridges, although it was increased, nevertheless remained below the level of contemporary requirements. Moreover, the comparatively small carrying capacity of individual ferry-bridge vehicles (8-25 tons) and the unadaptability of their design for the acceptance of self-propelled military cargoes from an unimproved bank limited the capabilities of these pontoon parks.

A new direction in the development of pontoon park designs, as reported by the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, was marked by the development of the ribbon bridge by American specialists. This bridge consists of big sections--folding pontoon units made of a light aluminum alloy. Their compartments are filled with a buoyant material of the foam plastic type. In the folded form, the units are transported on pontoon vehicles equipped with a special platform. After the units are dropped into the water they unfold automatically, forming a finished section of a bridge or ferry. Towing launches are provided in the set of the park to move the sections over the water, tow the ferries, and hold the assembled bridge against the current.

A bridge with a carrying capacity of 54 tons (122 meters long) can be laid from the park set in 50 minutes by a crew of 46 men. The design of the elements permits transporting them through the air by helicopters of the Chinook CH-47 type (one unit is transported during one trip).

The work experience of the American designers in the creation of the ribbon bridge was practiced on a large scale in other capitalist states, in particular in the FRG and in France. Thus, according to reports in the journal WEHRTECHNIK a new pontoon park is now reaching the engineer troops of the Bundeswehr which is being manufactured by West German specialists under a license purchased in the United States. In essence, it is a modified version of the American ribbon bridge park.

In the opinion of foreign military specialists, the time for the assembly of floating bridges and the capacity of ferry crossings are determined to a great extent by the technical capabilities of the towing launches. The launches now being supplied to the engineer troops are equipped with motors with a power of from 73.5 to 184 kW (100-240 hp) and develop a pull on the mooring lines of up to 2,000 kg. They are all equipped with screw propellers which, although they possess a higher efficiency in comparison with motors of the hydrojet type, increase the draft of the launches to one meter or more.

In the journal MILITARY REVIEW it is noted that one of the basic technical requirements now being imposed on tow launches is their ability to operate in shallow water. For this, the launch should have a low displacement, possess a high thrust characteristic, and have a bottom which withstands periodic setting on the shoals.

The foreign press reported on competitive tests of models of new tow launches being conducted within the framework of NATO. A British launch with a hydrojet engine has been selected for series production. Its power plant consists of two six-cylinder diesel engines with turbo-supercharger power of 132 kW (176 hp) each.

The great hopes of the NATO military specialists are connected with the accomplishment of the program for the creation of a general-purpose system of crossing equipment. As foreign military experts note, this direction of development of this type of engineer equipment is the principal direction for the next 10-15 years. It is presumed that the system will include tank and wheeled bridge layers, mechanized bridges on rigid supports, and floating bridges and ferries. According to the concept, all this equipment should have a high degree of standardization.

In accordance with the decision which has been adopted, each of the countries participating in the program (the United States, FRG, and Great Britain) is developing its own version of a set of crossing equipment and is conducting its comprehensive tests in accordance with a single methodology. Their results will be presented for consideration by a combined technical commission.

In the United States, it is contemplated using a bridge of a modular unit design (ribbon bridge). It consists of folding four-pontoon elements which, in design, are similar to the elements of the American ribbon bridge park. In the open form on the water one unit is a finished bridge section about 14 meters in length. The dimensions of the unit in folded form correspond to a standard bridge structural element. The rate of bridge laying, as the specialists presume, will reach six running meters per minute.

FRG designers proposed a bridge on floating supports which are a catamaran--two pontoons rigidly connected to each other. Also envisioned is the installation of an additional easily-removable float (in those cases where it is necessary to increase the carrying capacity of the bridge or ferry). Hydrojet engines are mounted on the pontoons in the bottom of the stern. In the water, such a floating support has a length of 18, width of 4, and height of 1.5 meters.

For the present, all this is only individual estimates, proposals, and experimental models. The accomplishment of the planned program has not been completed, and for the present the final version of the technical decision has not yet been adopted. But whatever it may be, one thing is clear--in building up their strategic potential and preparing for a global nuclear war, the NATO military strategists are also making more active efforts in improving the conventional armed forces.

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